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Thj-s paper  integrates  the  Heckscher-Ohl-in.  specific  - facLors,  and
Ricardian  models  of  production  with  appl-ications  to  international
trade  and  labor  economj-cs.  In  internationaL  trade.  factors  of
production  need  not  be  divided  over  trade  pol j-cy  and  factor  price
equalizat.ion  need  not  prevaj.l.  In  labor  economics,  we show that
the  earning  of  economic  rents  j"s not  j.nconsistent  with
competitive  market.s  in  general  equilibrium  and  that  process  and
skil-l--based  innovations  have  contrastinq  effects  on  waqe
'irramr:I  i trr
This  paper  is  based  on  the  idea  that  in  the  long-run  under
condj-tions  of  perfect  competition  capital  is  more  mobile  bet.ween
industries  than  Labor.  The  empirical  justification  for  this
assumption  is  that  workers  possess  comparative  advantage,  while,
in  the  long-run  at  least,  capiLal  is  perfectly  fungible.
Accordingly,  this  paper  develops  a  tractable  model  that.
integrates  three  well-known  general-  equil-j.brium  models--the
Heckscher-OhIin  mode1,  Ehe Ricardian  model  of  worker  comparative
advantage;  and  the  specific  factors  model.  Such a  model  sheds
some  fresh  light.  on  a  number  of  important  i-ssues  in  labor
economics  and  international  trade  and  a11ows  a  sharper
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The  Heckscher-Oh1j-n  (HO) model- of  production  is  useful-  for
the  insights  it  yields  into  the  relationships  between  commodity
and  factor  prices,  output  and  factor  supplies,  and  the  rol-e  of
factor  intensities.  The  Ricardian  model  of  comparative  advantage
is  useful  for  highlighting  the  role  of  relative  productivity
differences  in  determining  how factors  specialize  in  particular
industries  (Rosen.  J-978; Ruffin,  1988) .  Finally,  the  specific
factors  model  has  been  used  to  focus  on  the  contrast  between
mobile  and  immobj.l-e factors  withi.n  an  economy  (Samuelson,  l-97J-;
'Jones,  L97Lai  Mussa,  1974;  Neary,  1918') and  their  rofe  in
determining  the  course  of  reaf  factor  returns.  By  combining  the
three  models,  a  single  industry  can  be,  say,  capital  - intensive
and  yet  have  numerous  workers  that  have  Ricardian  comparative
advantages  (that  is.  earning  economic  rents)  in  that  industry;
yeE,  the  model  st j.11"  retains  some  (but  not  all)  of  the  familiar
Heckscher-Oh1in  properties.
Section  I  presents  an  overview  of  the  model  and  its
applicat  j-ons;  and  section  II  specifies  the  detailed  equilibrium
conditions.  Sect.ions  III  and  IV  examine  the  Stolper-  Samuel-son
and  factor  price  equalization  theorems.  SecEion  V  investigates
the  Rybczynski  theorem.  Seccion  Vf  summarizes  the  impact  of
different  kinds  of  technological  change.  Seclion  VfI  sket.ches
how to  include  the  case  of  many types  of  labor,  including  a
conts  j-nuum.  Finally,  section  VIII  summarizes  the  paper.L  Preview  and  Applicatione
A  specific  factor  is  one  that  is  always  used  in  a  particuLar
industry  and  has  an  ef fect.ive  value  of  zero  in  any  other
industry;  a  quasi-specific  factor  j-s  one  that  has  a  positive
value  in  another  industry  and,  !hus.  can  be  induced  to  leave  the
industry  if  its  economj-c rents  vanish.
Now consider  a  standard  two-sector  modef  in  which  there  are
two  goods  (1  and  2)  and  three  productive  factors:  capi.tal  ,  guasi-
specific  effective  labor  for  industry  1;  and  quasi-specific
effective  labor  for  industry  2.  The  two  tl4)es  of  quasi-specific
effective  labor  are  produced  under  const.ant  returns  by  either
type  1  labor  or  tl4)e  2  labor.  Hohrever,  type  1  ]abor  has  a
comparative  advantage  in  producing  effective  labor  for  industry  l-
and  tl4re  2  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  producing  effective
l-abor  for  industry  2.  For  simplicity,  we wilf  refer  t.o type  i
workers  as  having  a  comparative  advantage  in  industry  j-,  although
strictly  speaking  such  a  comparaEive  advantage  is  indirect.
Capital  is  perfectly  mobile  between  the  two  industries.  Each
tlt)e  of  labor  can  be  used  in  either  industry,  but  because  of
comparative  advantage  it  may be  the  case  that  each  labor  t14re  is
completely  specialized.  When each  l-abor  type  is  completely
specialized  it  is  because  economic  rents  are  being  earned,  and
there  is  no  incentive  to  work  in  the  other  industry.  Each  good
is  produced  by  a  st.andard  constant  - returns  - to - scale  production
function  wj-th  two  inputs  .  Factor  endoi,trments are  f ixed.
Figure  l- shows  the  production-poss  ibi  l ity  curve  for  theeconomy.  In  the  range,  AB,  industry  L  is  very  sma11 because  the
price  of  good  1  is  low.  This  means tha!  there  are  no  economic
rents  earned  by  the  workers  who  have  a  comparative  advantage  in
that  industry:  they  must  work  in  industry  2  as  wel-l- because
otherwise  they  would  be  unemployed.  If  w,  is  the  wage  of  type  i
effective  labor,  in  the  range  AB the  ratio  wr/w,  is  fixed.  This
is  so  because  when  two  E)4)es  of  labor  are  used  in  an  indust.r'.'  rn
this  case  industry  2.  wages  exactly  reflect  productivity
differences  (which  are  assumed fixed)  .  Now as  the  price  of  good
1  rises,  eventually  economic  rents  wil-l-  appear  for  workers  with  a
comparative  advantage  in  that  good;  at  that  point.  all  type  1
workers  wil-l-  be  in  industry  1.  We now  enter  the  BC range  of  the
product  ion-pos  sibi  l ity  curve.  In  this  range,  both  types  of
workers  are  compl-eteIy  specialized  and  t,he  model  works  exactly
fike  the  specific  factors  model  (,fonee,  L9'7l-a, Samuelson.  1-971)  .
As  the  price  of  good  1  rises,  the  hrage ratio  wr/w,  must  aLso
rise  because  capital  is  atstracted  away  from  industry  2  towards
industry  1.  driving  down  the  return  t'o  C)t)e  2  labor  just  as  in
the  specific  factors  model .  As  t.he price  of  good  l- continues  to
rise,  the  economic  rent  of  ttrpe  2  workers  eventuallv  evaporates
and  some of  these  workers  move into  industry  1,  This  is  the  CD
range  of  the  product  ion-possibil  i ty  frontier;  again,  the  ratio
wr/w"  is  fixed.  In  the  AB  and  CD ranges  the  model  works  exactly
the  Heckscher-Oh1in  model-; but  one  of  the  factors  is  earning  an
economic  rent.  The  l-ink  betr,reen  real  wages  and  commodity  prices
j.s  then  entirely  governed  by  factor-  intens  ity  conditions.The  advantage  of  incl-uding  Ricardian  comparative  advantages
inside  the  Heckscher-OhLin  model  of  competitive  prodr-iction  is
that  one  preserves  the  simplicity  of  such  a  model  without
sacrificing  a  somewhat richer  and  more  intellectualfy  satisfying
interpretation  of  economic  data.  In  a  single  model,  we have
features  of  specific  factors,  economic  rents  that  are  a  function
of  price,  and  Heckscher-Ohlin  properties  such  as  the  importance
of  factor  intensity  conditions.  It  is  hoped  that  such  a  model
might  be  useful  to  both  trade  economj.sts  and  l-abor  economists.
Trade  economists  shoul"d  find  such  a  model  useful  because  they
can  work  with  a  modef  that  aflows  them  to  get  away  from  some of
the  more  peculiar  results  of  Lhe  HO model-.  For  example,  in  the
two-by-two  HO model ,  with  identical  production  functions,  the
absence  of  frictions  in  goods  markets  or  factor  inLensity
reversals,  factor  price  equalization  obtains  when both  goods  are
produced  in  both  countries.  In  the  present  model .  factor  price
equalization  breaks  down not  because  there  are  three  factors,  but
because  it  is  sometsimes the  case  that  two  of  the  factors  do  not
directly  compete  with  each  other.  Factor  price  equalization
however  wil-l-  obtain,  however,  if  there  is  a  long-run  trend  in
relative  commodity  prices.
Moreover,  to  trade  economists  the  model- allows  one  to  escape
from  the  straightjacket  of  Stolper  -  Samuel  son  when di-scussing  wage
issues.  The  Stolper-  Samuel  son  theorem  states  that  faclor
intensities,  not  comparative  advantage,  determines  the  course  of
real-  returns  when prices  change.  Thus,  in  a  Stolper  -  Samuel  sonworl-d  all  workers  wou]d  want  to  protect  the  labor-intensive
industry,  whecher  uorking  in  theit  industry  or  noL.  In  the
present  model,  each  worker  may want  to  protect  the  industry  :-n
which  he  or  she  has  a  comparative  advantage  (we will  say  more
about  this  issue  later)  .2
Turning  to  the  labor  economics  literature,  the  sharing  of
economic  rents  has  been  interpreted  as  indicating  non- compet.  it. ive
labor  markeEs  (e.9.  Blanchflower,  et.  al .,  1995) .  Hordever, in
the  present  model  no  such  interpretation  is  warranted  because
economic  rents  are  price-determined  in  a  compet.itsive  environment,
The  model  also  shows  that  cerEain  empirical  issues  can  be
illuminated  by  first  principles.  For  example,  in  ,Juhn.  et.  al .
(l-993),  it  is  reported  that  the  ratio  of  skilled  to  unskj-l-led
wages  stayed  roughly  constant  in  the  l-950s buE  rose  sharpLy  in
the  1980s.  The  19?0s  were  a  transition  period  in  which  the
education  premium  fel1  while  the  unobserved  skil1  premium  rose.
This  j.ssue  has  been  finked  to  trends  in  international  trade,
demand;,or  technol-ogy  that  favor  skil-l-ed  workers,  The present
model  shows  that  permanent  trends  in  relative  commodity  prices  or
Lechnological  progress  in  industri.al  processes  wil-1" only  result
in  temporary  changes  in  relative  wages.  However,  improvements  in
the  skill-s  of  workers  can  have  permanent  effects  (abstracting
from  the  costs  of  t.raininq)  . Thus,  I  would  argue  t.hat  continued
j-ncreases  in  lhe  use  of  computer-aided  technoloqies  (documented
'Magee (1980)  presents
agreed  on  protection  versus
evidence  that  19  out  of  22  indust.ries
free  trade  "in  Berman,  et.  aI .,  79941 may only  have  temporary  effects  on  wage
inequality  if  the  l-abor  force  itself  does  not  improve  its  ski1Is.
In  ocher  words,  we must  make a  sharp  distinction  between  the
impact  of  computers  and  t.he  impact  of  education  on  observed  wage
inequality.
II.  The  Model
IJet  us  begin  with  a  specific  factors  model .  Two sectors  use
mobile  capital  and  specific  ef fectsj-ve  labor  to  produce  goods
under  constant  returns  to  scale.  For  given  commodity  prices  and
given  endowments of  capital  and  the  two  tl4)es  of  effective  labor,
capital  moves between  the  sectors  until-  its  renLal-  rate  is
equalized;  this  determines  both  the  outputs  of  the  two  goods  as
well  as  the  returns  to  the  ef fectj-ve  labor  supplies.
Forma1]y.  industry  i  (i  =  1,2)  has  the  constsants  -  returns  -  to-
scale  production  function  wj.th  all  the  usual  concavity
xi  =  Fi (Ki,  Ei),  (1)
where  E,  is  the  effective  labor  used  in  indust.ry  i.
A  convenient  way  t.o analyze  the  model  is  to  utilize  the
constant  -  returns  -  t'o- scale  assumption  (Samuelson,  1953;  ,Jones,
a971ar.  Let  a*,  and  a",  denote  the  amounts  of  capital  and
effective  labor  per  unit  of  good i.  The price  of  each good,  pr,
must  equal  the  unit  cost  of  production;  thus.
axir  +  aEiwi = pi  (2)
where  r  and  w, are  the  prj-ces  of  capital  and  effective  labor,
To  keep  the  notation  simple  we  supprese  the  dependence  of  thearj's  depend  on  the  factor  prj.ces  wi  and  r.  The  two  equations  in
(2),  for  given  commodity  prices.  are  not  sufficient  to  determine
the  three  factor  prices.  As  in  ,Jones  (1-971-a)  ,  we must  add  the
fu]l  empl-ovment  conditi-ons
aKrxl  +  aK2x.2 =  K (3)
(4)
the The five  equations  (2)-(4)  suffice  to  determine  the  two  xi's,
two wages,  and r  for  given  values  of  the  pi's,  the  Ei's,  and K.
To  int.roduce  Ricardian  comparalive  advantage  we  need  only
suppose  that  effective  l-abor  is  produced  by  the  Ricardian
production  function:
Ei  =  Lri/b.i  +  Lr;/b21  ,
where  L1i  is  the  amount  of  t)Itr)e j  labor  emp]oyed the
production  of  effective  l-abor  of  type  i.  The bii's  are  the  fixed
Ricardian  production  coefficient.s;  and,  of  course,  represent  the
amount  of  raw  labor  required  to  produce  a  uniL  of  effect.ive
l-abor.  .We  could,  of  course,  assume any  number  of  such  Ricardian
fact,ors  (even  a  continuum)  ;  however,  in  the  interests  of
simplicity,  we will  restrict.  our  present  anal-ysis  to  only  two
such  labor  types.  Later  we  shall  indicate  the  implications  of
adding  more  Ricardian  factors.
We assume  that
aBixi  =  Ei (t  =  L,2)
brr/br,  <  b2L/b22 .
We are  here  assuming  that  tlpe  i  labor  has  a  comparative
advantage  in  industry  i.  that  is.  in  producing  the  effective
1n
,s
(5)labor  used  in  industry  i.
We cannot  solve  the  model  as  in  the  epecific  factors  model
because  the  quantities  Lr,  are  not  yet  determined.  However,  j-n
t.he range  BC of  Figure  l  each  labor  type  is  specialized  in  the
industry  in  which  it  has  a  comparative  advantage,  that  is  1-.,r,  =  L,
=  0.  We can  then  solve  tor  the  factor  prices  by  appending  the
equat ions
Ei  =  L1lbii  l7)
where  L,  is  the  supply  of  type  j  labor  to  the  economy.  The
resul-ting  effectj-ve  wage raE.es  (the  wr's)  can  now be  determined.
This  sol-ution  will  in  fact  prevail  (for  given  pr's)  provided
no  worker  has  an  incentive  to  work  in  another  indusEry.  Let  wii
denote  the  wage type  i  worker  earns  in  industry  i.  Of  course,
workers  earn  Ehe  value  of  their  marginal-  product  in  producing
effective  labor.  Qfrren l<\  ir  ic  aacrr to  see  that
w11= wi/b1i
In  general,  however,  we  cannoE  have  workers  of  both
higher  rrages  in  same.industry  if  both  industries  are
The  differences  between  the  tvro  sides  of  the
simply  measure  the  economic  rent6  earned  by
(8)
tl4)es  earning
viabfe.  Type  1 workers  cannot  earn  higher  wages in  industry  2,
t,hat, is:
wr/br,  > wr/br,  (9)
Similarly,  type  2  workers  cannot  earn  higher  wages  j.n  industry
1,  that  is:
w2/b22 >  wr/bz, (10)
above  inequalities
each  type  of  labor.Both  (9)  and  (10)  wil-l-  hold  provided
62../b22  >  wr/wz  =  br'-/br"
This.  of  course,  is  analogous  to  a  simiLar  condition  in
Ricardian  t.heory  of  internationaf  trade,  with  effective




effective  wage ratj-o  to  be  outside  the  range  depicted  in  (9);
for.  otherwise,  all  labor  would  be  in  one  industry,
When the  commodity  price  ratio  is  such  Ehat  strict
inequalities  prevail  in  (11),  the  model will  work  exactly  like
the  specific  factors  modeI.  Let  us  denote  the  relative  price  of
good  !. as  p  = pr/pz.  In  the  open  range  defined  by  (11) ,  as  p
rises,  so  will  the  effective  wage ratio  w1/w2.  However,  in  the
specific  factors  model  a  change  in  p  has  an  ambiguous  effect  on
the  real  return  to  capilal--the  mobile  factor  in  this  case--and
cl-ear-cut  effects  on  the  specific  - factors  (see  Ruffin  and  ,Jones,
f977)  -  However,  in  our  case  the  quasi-specific  factors,  raw
labor,  may  leave  an  industry  if  the  return  f al-Ls  to  the  point  of
wiping  out  thej.r  economic  rents.  Now,  as  p  rises,  the  output  of
good  t  will  rise  so1e1y  due  t.o the  attraction  of  capital  out  of
industry  2  into  industry  1. As  the  effective  waqe ratio  rises.
however.  it  will  eventually  hit  the  upper  bound  of  (l-1) At  this
point  type  2  workers  are  indifferent  between  working  in  the  E.wo
industries.  I!  now geens  clear  that  at  tbie  particular  price
ratio  the  modeL  take8  on  a  quile  different  flavor.  Indeed,  lhe
model  now  becoueg  Heckscher-Ohlin  wlth  some of  the  attendant
characterietice  .
10This  conclusion  is  very  significant  because  it  means that  in
a  model  with  quasi-specifi.c  factors,  we do  noE get  simple
relationships  between  commodity  prices  and  real-  factor  returns.
as  in  either  the  HO or  specific  factors  model.
example,  the  price  of  the  capital  - intens  ive  good  rises,  at  first
the  workers  that  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  that  good
benefit  whil-e  all  other  workers  are  hurt.  But  as  the  price
continues  to  rise  a  point  wil-l-  be  reached  where  al-l  workers  are
hurt.  On the  other  hand,  if  the  price  of  labor-intensive  good
rj-ses,  the  workers  who  have  a  comparative  advantage  in  that
industry  benefit,  other  workers  are  hurt;  but  event.ually  all
workers  are  helped  as  the  price  continues  to  rise.
These  are  useful  results.  We know  from  empirical  studies
that  when profits  in  an  industry  rise,  so-called  skilled  workers
in  that  industry  also  benefit  \^rhereas tshe unskill-ed  do  not
benefit  so much (see Blanchflower,  et-  a7,  1990).  This  fact  may
be  explained  by  the  current  model .  The  current  model  l-mplies,
however.  that  such  a  relationship  eventually  depends  on  the
factor-  intensity  of  the  industry  in  question.  and  that  at  extreme
values  factor  intensities  matter.  This  may help  explain  why
StoLper-  Samue  lson  effects  are  difficult.  t.o observe  (see  footnote
2);  they  appl-y  to  the  extremes,  not  to  the  "normalrr  cases.
If  capital  is  regarded  as  the  mobile  factor--i.e.,  the factor
al so without  long-run  comparative  advantages-  -then  this  mode]
suggests  that  for  middle  ranges  of  commodj.ty prices  the
between  commodity  prices  and  the  real-  returns  to  capital
fink
is
11ambiguous.3  This,  too.  has  some explanatory  value.  Few seem to
care  about  the  effects  of  t.ariffs,  taxes,  or  subsidies  on  the
returns  to  capitalisEs  as  much as  the  returns  to  labor.  One
expfanation  woul-d be  that  labor,s  returns  are  more  profoundly
effected  because it  is  t.he quasi-specific  factor.
Let  me now  show  these  resul-ts  forma11y.  Suppose  p  changes
so  that  the  ratio  of  effective  wage rates  equals  the  lower  or
upper  bound of  (11);  that  is,  wrfw, = bir/bir. Now the  pricing
equations  (2)  become  :
aKlr+aE1bj1wr/bp=p
ax2r  +  aE2W2 =1
The  input-output  coefficients  dti  =  4.ii  (r,  wi),  j  =  K,  Er.
(12)
Us  j-ng
t.he  subsidiary  relation  wr/w,  =  bn/bi2  we  can  obviously  soLve  for
r  and  the  w.'s  for  any  given  commodity  prices.  Notice  that  as  p
riBes,  w1/wz  eventually  jumps  from  brr/b12 Lo  brr/brr;  in  the  sequel
it  wil-l  be  necessary  to  study  the  ramifications  of  Ehis
nh  onnmon  nn
How can  we  solve  for  outputs?  When p  is  high  enough  so  that
wrfw"  =  b2r/b22,  where  both  labor  t14:es  work  in  indust.ry  1,  the
output  equations  are:
aK1X1 +  aK2X2  =K
3This  model  actually  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  ,Jones
and  Ruffin  (l-975) .  Tn that  paper  there  is  mobile  capital  between
two  countries  and  the  labor  forces  of  the  two  count.ries  produce
two  goods  with  different  technologies.  However,  t.he  l-ab6r  force
of  each  country  may be  regarded  as  a  tl4)e  of  labor.  ,Jones  and.
Ruffin  (L975)  show that  at  least  one  country  musC specialize  (in
free  trade)  ,  and  one  country  may produce  both  goods,  which  means
the  country's  labor  force  is  split  between  two  industries.de1xr  =  L,  /brr+  Lrr/b^
dnzxz =  (L,  -  I_,21)  /bzz
However,  if  we  combine  the  1ast.  two  equations  in  (l-3)  we
aK1xl  +  ar2K2  =  K
aE1x1b11/b12  +  allzxz  =  Lr/brz  +  Lr/b",
(13)
obt.  ain
aKrxl  +  aK2x2  =K
aElx1  +  a}2x2b22/b2r  =  Lt/brr-  +  L2/b2L  (l-4 )
In  the  l-orrr  p  case.  where  wr/w,  =  brr/bn  so  that  both  labor  types
work  in  industry  2,  the  output  equations  arer
(t4' )
Equations  (12)  and  (14)  or  (14')  parallel  the  standard  HO  model
in  the  sense  that  we  solve  the  pricing  equations,  (l-2).  first  and
then  the  output  equations,  (14)  or  (14'),  for  t.he xr's.  We wiLl-
subsequently  have  occasion  tso analyze  the  quantity  I-\/b\+  l-'2/b2i,
which  is  maximum amount  of  type  j  effective  l-abor  that  the
economy can  generate.  With  this  interpretative  difference  in
factor  endowments  and  the  presence  of  economic  rents  in  the
earnj-ngs  of  one  of  the  l"abor  types  it  remains  to  study  whether
the  st.andard  properties  of  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  rnodel  ho1d.
IIL  Stolper-  Salruel aon
The  relationship  between  commodity  prices  and  factor  prices
the  HO region  of  the  economy is  embedded in  equations  (L2).
might  appear  that  Stolper-  Samuel son  might  have  to  be  modified
owing  to  the  presence  of  the  ratio  bi1/bi2.  However,  it  is  there
because  w,  = wrbil/bjr;  therefore,  r;1 = w'  where  the  circumflex
over  a  variable  means a  logarithmic  derivative,  e.S.,  p  =  ap/p.
Totally  differentiating  equations  (l-2)  we  find  that  the  equations
t-n
II
13of  motion  are  identicaf  in  al-l- respects  to  the  standard  HO model
(caA  ,T.\naa  l qAq\  .
dxlr+0ErW2=p
0K2t+  0E2w2  =  0
define  AKi  =  raxi/pr  and  d"t  =  wra"i,/pi,
unity.  To  solve  it  is  convenient
(15)
must  add We where  the  shares
fa  rlaf  ine
o(j)  =  0  K!0  Ez -  0  E!0  K2
We l-et  D depend  on  j  because,  rewriting:
D(j)  =  (wrr  /pl  ldrrde" -  aoasrbll/b1z)
The  index  j  in  equation  (15')  denotes  the  l-abor
in  both  industries.  Thus,  we have
fr,/p = -oK2/Dq)
i/p  =  0,,/D(jl
(fo./
(15.)
type  that  is  used
(t7  )
(rdl
We must,  of  course,  determine  the  sign  of  D(j).  If  the  capital
share  is  higher  in  good  l- than  in  good  2,  good  1  is  capital-
intensive  so  that  0*r/0r, ,  0u/0r,  or  that  D(j)  is  positive.
Here  it  is  important  to  note  that  we must  define  the  capital-
intensity  of  an  industry  by  the  financial  ratios  rather  Chan the
physical-  ratios,  a*i/ a'i;  for  the  physical  ratios  cannot  really  be
compared  since  the  denominator  is  in  different  units.  Clearly,
the  effects  of  relative  prices  on  real  returns  noL  only  fit  into
the  Stolper  - Samuelson  mold,  t.hey  are  of  the  same  order  of
magnitude  in  the  low-p  (where  wr/w" = br1/b12) or  t'he  high-p  case
(where  wr/w,  =  b2r/bzz) .
There  is,  however,  one  key  difference  between  the  present
model  and  the  standard  HO model:  factor  i-ntensitv  reversals  are
t4possibl-e  with  fixed  factor  endowments.  This  is  cfear  from  (l-5').
Comparing  rrrith  (15)  we see  that  if  the  production  functions  are
Cobb-Doug1a6.  where  the  drr's  are  constant,  factor-  intensity
reversafs  are  not  possible;  however.  in  general  ,  we must  admit.
this  possibility.  As  an  example,  if  the  production  functions
are  Leontief  ,  as  b1/b.,z  jumps  f rom  brr/br2  to  b"r/b"",  iE  is
possible  for  the  sign  of  D(j)  to  change.  Therefore,  the  link
between  commodity  prices  and  factor  prices  can  differ  in  lhe  two
HO regions  of  the  economy.
We will,  however,  make the  super-strong  assumption  that  t.he
sign  of  D(j)  does  not  change.  This  will  surely  be  the  case  if
the  elastlcities  of  substitution  are  not  too  much different  from
unity.  The  workings  of  t'he  model  are  shown  by  Figure  2  under  the
assumption  that  qood  l- is  caoital  - intensive In  the  upper
panel,  we  show the  rel-ationship  between  the  commodity  price  ratio
and  Uhe effective  wage ratio.  In  the  range  p  €  (p',p,')  we have
the  epecific  - factors  model-,  with  al-I  type  1  labor  in  industry  1
and  E)t)e  2  labor  in  industry  2;  as  the  refative  price  of  good  1
rises,  so  does  the  effective  rrrage  of  type  1- labor  compared  to
type  2  regardless  of  any  factor  intensity  condit.ions.  In  the
lower  panel,  we show that  the  relationship  between  the  relative
price  of  good  l  and  the  real  earnings  of  type  l-  fabor  is
monotonically  decreasing. This  is  so  because  when p  < p'  or  p  >
prr the  model  takes  on  the  key  Heckscher-Oh1in  characteristics;
with  good  1  capital  -  intensi-ve,  the  reaL  return  to  l-abor  falLs
with  the  relative  price  of  good  1.  On the  other  hand,  the
15relat  j-onship  between  p  and  the  real  return  of  type  2  labor  is
non-monotonic;  for  in  the  specific  -  factors  range  of  the  modet  as
the  price  of  good  l  rises  the  return  Eo type  2  Labor  fal-Is
regardless  of  factor  intensi.ties.  Indeed,  it  must  be  the  case
that  for  one  of  the  types  of  labor  there  is  a  montonic
relationship,.  while  for  the  other  it  j-s non-monoEonic.  Thus.
Figure  2  is  perfectly  general-  when there  are  no  fact.or -  intensity
reversals.  although  the  comparison  between  the  real  wages  of  the
two  types  of  workers  can  be  anything  (depending  on  absolute
advantsage ) .
What  is  interestinq  abouc  this  model  is  that  the  Heckscher-
Ohl-in  character  of  the  model  appears  at  the  exEremes, This  is
not  really  surprising.  The  power  of  HO comes from  competition
from  mobil-e  factors:  unl-ess  relative  prices  are  at  an  extreme
enough  level  to  bring  about  competition  between  factors  of
different  types,  fact.or  specificity  wil-l-  rule  the  day.
IV.  Factor  PrJ.ce Equalization
Suppose  $re now  have  two  countries,  home and  foreign,
identical  in  all  respects  except  factor  endowments.  The  home
country  is  well  endowed  with  type  2  labor  and/or  capital  .
Figure  3  shows  the  relationship  between  commodity  price  and
ef fect.ive  wage ratios  for  the  home  (H)  and  foreign  (F)  countries
under  the  assumption  that  good  1is  capital  - intens  ive .
Imagine  first  t.hat  the  two  countries  are  exactly  the  same as  j-n
the  foreign  country,  so  that.  curve  F describes  the  relat.ionship.
The specific-factor  range  is  the  interval  (p..p").  Adding  more
16tl4>e  2  labor  to  the  home country  wou1d  clearly  raise  wr/w,  for
any  p;  so  the  H  curve  would  have  to  be  above  the  F  curve.  Why
woul-d  more  capitsal  shift  up  the  H  curve  compared  to  the  F  curve?
Again  suppose  all  endowments  are  the  same as  in  F.  Now add  a  bit
more  of  mobile  capital  to  the  home country.  The  curve  wil-1
shift  up  because  more  capital-  wilI  favor  the  capital  -  intensive
industry,  and  tl4)e  1  labor  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  that
industry  . This  is  easy  to  show:  This  comes directly  from
applying  the  rhat.u  caf cul-us  Eo equation  (2).  We are  asking  what
happens  to  the  effective  wage ratio  for  fixed  prj-ces.  When
endowments  change,  factor  prices  change;  from  Shephard's  Lemma  it
follows  that  d*ri+  o"rir, =  9.  Since  i,  =-i|*i/  |ri,  it  f ol-l-oi,rs  that
'';r-t;r= i  (0x2/|Ez -TKL/0,,).  clearly,  an  increase  i-n K depresses  r--
so  i  is  negative.  If  good 1is  capital  -  inEensive ,  so  0*2/0s2  <
lKlfeE!  ,  then  wr/w,  must  rise.
Now we can  discuss  factor  price  equalization  (FPE).  The main
proposition  is  that  if  p  e  (p",  p,'),  there  cannoE be  FPE.
However,'FPE  can  obtain  if  either  p  < p"  or  p  > p";  and it  will
obtain,  of  course,  if  the  factor  endowments of  the  two  countries
are  suf f icientl-y  cfose. Let  us  take  the  case  where  p  > p" In
this  case,  equations  {12)  and  (14)  govern  the  model .  The
effective  wage ratio  is  wr/w, = brr/br". Provided  both  qoods  are
produced  and  there  are  no  factor  -  intensity  reversals.  equations
(1-2], for  j  =  2  will  determi.ne  the  factor  prices  in  both  countries
as  long  as  t.he  factor  endowments  of  the  two  countries  l-ie  in  t.he
same cone  of  diversification  (that  is,  the  set  of  endowments
t7consistent  with  a  single  set  of  factor  prices)  .n
Under  aL1  other  circumstances  FPE fails.  For  example,  if  p  e
(p',p'),  then  in  the  foreign  country  the  wage ratio  is  governed
by  wr/w,  -- bLL/b,2,  with  type  1  Labor  working  in  both  indust.ries,
but  in  the  home countrv  we  are  on  the  H  curve  itsel-f  and  the
relative  price  of  type  1- labor  is  higher--FPE  cannot  hol-d.
V.  The  Rybczyngki  Theoreo
I  now  want.  t'o  investigate  the  Rybczynski  theorem.  We wil-f
show that  if  the  Stolper  -  Samuel  son  theorem  holds,  so  does
Rybczynski.  This  may not  seem remarkable;  but  in  ,Jones  (1971b)
it  is  shown that  when different  facEor  prices  are  paid  in  two
industries  Stolper-  Samuelson  does  not  imply  Rybcyznski.  However,
there  is  a  crucial  di-stinction  between  factor  market  distortions
as  analyzed  by  ,Jones  (l-97r-b) and  the  current  model;  different
factor  prices  ref l-ect  productivity  differences  in  the  present
case  so  we would  not  expect  lhe  ,.fones result.
Let  us  just  consider  the  case  where  Ehe price  of  good  1  is
such  that  some  L)t)e  2  labor  is  involved  in  industry  1,  that  rs,
equations  (14)  app1y.  Earl-ier.  we saw that  factor  intensJ-ty
could  be  defined  by  using  the  financiaf  ratios  0*r/0"r.  We novr
need  to  define  the  physicaL  factor  intensities.  This  is  somewhat
tricky  because  we  no  longer  have  a  homogeneous  l-abor  force.  Let'
us  examine  the  l-ast  equation  j.n  (1a),  that  is;
aE1x1 +  arrxrbrr/b21  =  Lr/br,  +  L"fb^
aSee Chipman  (1955)
18The  quantity  Lr/br:  +  Lr/b2i  is  the  maximum amount  of  effective
labor  of  type  j  that  can  be  produced  in  the  economy;  cal-l-  this
quantity  Vl .  When relative  prices  are  fixed.  so  are  the  aij's  as
in  the  standard  model .  Let  us  define  trKi =  aKixi/K  (as  usual)  ,- but
define  l.Eij =  aEixi/Vj.  Consider  now a  change  in  factor
endoraments only.  Now.  differentiation  of  (1a)  feads  to:
).*rir+trK2ir=R
tr"rri,  +  xE2!*.2b22/b2r  =  i!.  (  19  )
Recall  the  definition  for  the  financial  ratios  in  (15'):  D(2)  =
(w"r /p)  [a*ra",  -  aK2a'rb2rfb22)  .  In  this  case.  type  2  labor  is  used
in  both  industries.  Now for  the  physical  case.  note  that
A(2)  =  ),K1),821b22  /b21 -  trotr"r,
=  (xrxr/KVr)  (a*rarrbr,'/b",  -  aK2aE1)
Obviously,  D(2)  is  positive  or  negat  j.ve as  A(2)
negative.  Accordingly,  solving  for  i,  we find
*., = R)rrr1b22/A  (2) br1 -  'orxrr/L(2,
i,  = 'orx*,/  a2) -  RrE.1/a  (2  )
(20)
is  posiEive  or
(2a)
(22)
C1early,  since  A(2)  .is  positj-ve  when good  1- is  capital-  -  intensive,
$re obtain  the  fami]iar  Rybczynski  result  that  an  increase  in  K
increases  (decreases)  the  output  of  good  1  (good  2)  while  an
increase  potentiaf  effective  labor  V1 increases  (decreases)  the
output  of  good  2  (good  1) .  A  similar  result  would  obtain  if  type
1  l-abor  were  used  in  both  industries.  we thus  obtain  the
theorem  that  in  any  of  the  HO ranges  of  the  economy  the  familiar
Stolper  -  Samuel-  son  and  Rybczynski  resuLts  obtain;  however,  unlike
the  standard  HO modeI,  there  can  be  factor  intensity  reversafs
19between  the  HO regions.
VI.  Technological  Change
We now  consider  the  irnpact  of  technological  change  on
production  patterns  and  factor  prices,  holding  commodity  prices
constant.  Given  the  two-level  production  function,  it  is  obv.rous
that  technical  change  can  either  effect  the  production  of
effective  fabor  ("skiIl--based  technological  change,')  or  technical-
change  in  the  industry  itself  by  virtue  of  new insights  into
conbining  capital  and  effective  Labor  ("process  technical
change" ) .  I  will  only  consider  cases  of  neutral  technical-
change.  Moreover,  just  because  the  model- permits  a  distinction
between  Ehe  two  t14>es of  technological  changTe does  not  mean  thaE
the  real"  world  works  that  way.  Nevertheless,  we proceed  as  if  iE
does  and  ask  whet.her  it  makes any  difference.
If  the  Ricardian  production  function  does  not  change,  that
is,  if  the  productivity  of  raw  labor  remains  constant,  an
improvement  in  the  conversj-on  of  effective  l-abor  and  capital  into
goods  will  have  an  impact  that  is  similar  to  a  change  in
commodity  prices.  As  pointed  ouE by  Findlay  and  crubert  (1-959)
and  analyzed  in  detail  by  ,fones  (1955),  one  can  consider  neutral
technological  progress  as  fu1ly  equivalent  to  an  increase  in  the
price  of  a  good.  If  we consider  the  unit  value  isoquant.  for  any
good,  if  the  price  increases  the  isoquant  moves  in  uniformly
along  any  ray  from  the  origin;  the  same occurs  with  neutral
technological  progress.  Accordingly,  whether  there  is  an
increase  in  the  price  of  a  good  or  neutral  technological
20progress,  one  achieves  a  parallel  impact  on  resource  al-locatr-on
and  factor  prices.  Thus.  holding  commodity  prices  constant,
neutral-  technological  improvement  in  an  industry  will  bring  about
expansion  of  such  an  industry  and  will.  of  course,  benefit  those
factors  with  a  comparative  advantage  in  that  industry  or  the
facEor  in  which  the  industry  is  intensive  in  the  Heckscher-Ohl-in
region  of  the  economy.  Such  technical  change  will  only  change
wage  inequality  if  it  occurs  in  the  specific  - factors  region  of
the  economy;  otherwj.se,  either  all  wages  rise  or  faLl-.
What  is  the  impact  of  skill-based  technological  change?  It
should  be  obvious  that  if  a  group  of  workers  become  more
productive  their  market  wages will  rise  relative  to  olher  groups.
This  has  a  quite  different  impact  on  observed  wages;  buE  if  such
technological  change  refl-ecte  investments  in  human capital  it  is
questionable  i,rrhether  r,rages net  of  these  costs  show  divergent
t.rends.  To properly  analyze  this  it  is  necessary  to  include
learning-by-doing  and  human capital  investments.  However,  the
end  result  is  higher  productivity  and  it  may be  useful  to  just
consider  the  consequences  of  autonomous  improvements  in  some
worker's  productivity.  L.,et us  suppose  that  good  1  is  the  ski11-
based  good  so  that.  EIG)e 1  labor  can  be  considered  skj-Iled  labor
compared  to  ts]4)e 2  labor.  The  rat.io  brr/br.'  ls  Eype  1  l_abor,s
productivity  advantage  over  t)4)e  2  labor  in  industry  j.
To  be  concrete  I  assume  that  type  1  wages  are  higher  than
type  2  wages.  Now suppose  that  t14>e 1  labor  becomes  uniformly
more  productive  in  aLl  industries.  Since  each  br,  faI1s  by  the
2lsame percentage.  the  ratio  b11/b12  remains  constant.  The  effect
of  this  on  wage  structure  depends  on  the  region  in  which  the
economy is  operat.ing.
First  consider  the  case  in  which  the  economy operates  in
either  one  of  thd  HO regi-ons  of  the  economy.  In  this  case,  wr,/w,
= bir/biz  so  that  nothing  happens  to  effective  wages,  as  is  cl-ear
from  the  pricing  equations  (12).  However,  type  1 wages  will  rise
by  Ehe  j-mprovement  j-n  their  productivity  (wrt  -  wi/ba)  and  wage
inequality  will  rise  by  exactly  the  same proportion  because  wages
of  type  2  workers  remain  exactly  the  same  (wr,  =  wr/br).  However,
due  to  Rybczynski  effects,  whether  the  economy  moves  away  from  or
deeper  into  the  HO region  depends  on  whether  the  refative  price
of  capital  - intens  ive  goods  is  Iow  or  high.  When type  1  labor
becomes more  productive,  Rybczynski  effects  become relevant  and
the  output  of  t'he  capital  - intens  ive  good  must  fa11,  as  is  clear
from  either  (14)  or  (14,). If  the  price  of  the  capital--
intensive  good  is  already  low,  the  economy  will  become  more
deeply  entrenched  in  the  init.ial  HO region;  if  the  price  of  the
capital-  - intensive  good  is  high,  the  economy  will  move  towards  the
specific  factors  region  on  the  economy.
If  the  productivity  enhancement. occurs  when the  economy is  in
the  spec  i fic  -  factors  region  of  the  economy,  an  improvement  in
type  l- labor's  product  j.vity  will  cause  wage inequalily  Eo rise  by
more  than  the  rj-se  in  productivity.  This  is  because  the
effective  wage of  tlpe  1  workers  wiII  rise  whiLe  t.he effective
wage  of  type  2  workers  will  fal-l,  thus  enhancing  the  impact  of
22the  improvement  in  t)4)e  1  workers'  skills.  However,  the
economy' s  production  of  good  1wi11  rj-se  relative  to  good  2.
Eventually,  the  economy will  find  itself  in  the  Heckscher-Ohl-in
region  of  the  economy.  Once  this  occurs,  a  uniform  improvement
in  t14>e 1  labor's  productivity  will  have  no  impact  on  the
effective  wage ratio,  for  given  commodity  prices,  but  wil-l  have  a
proportionate  impact  on  the  real-  earnings  of  type  l-  labor.
VIf.  Sone Poeeible  E EtensionE
I-,et  us  now  consider  extending  the  model  to  include  more
Ricardian  factors.  For  concreteness  imaqine  a  third  Ricardian
f actor-  -cal-l-  it  z--such  that
brr/brz  .  b"r/b""  .  brr/b"" (22)
C1ear1y,  it  is  now possible  for  the  effective  wage ratio  to  be
equal  t.o  b"r/b"r.  At  this  point,  t)T)e  z  labor  is  employed  j-n  both
industries--but  t14:e  1  Labor  and  type  2  Labor  are  earning
economic  rents  and  so  are  entirely  speciafized.  However,  the
effective  wage ratio  will  be  fj-xed  until  al-l- type  z  labor  is
absorbed'in  one  industry  or  the  other.  In  Ehe range  of  commodicy
prices  where  type  z  labor  works  in  both  industries,  any  change  in
prices  will-  exert  Stolper  -  Samuel  son  effects  on  the  effective  wage
rates--just  as  before.  For  example,  if  good t  is  capital-
intensive,  an  increase  in  p  will  depress  boEh  rrrl and  w2 by  equaL
percentages.  However,  the  model  no  longer  works  like  the
specific  - factors  model.  Clearly,  the  more  labor-t)4)es  that  exist
in  the  economy the  smaller  will  be  the  specific-factors  range  of
the  economy.  Indeed,  with  a  continuum  of  labor  tl4)es,  it  would
23appear  that  the  model  would  al-ways  behave  exactsLy  like  the  Ho
model  in  sma11 comparative  statics  exercises--with  this
exception:  facEor  price  equalization  would  be  very  unlikeIy.
However,  if  a  continuum  is  considered  unreal-istic,  the  case
of  a  finite  number  of  ]abor  types  leads  to  some interesting
conclusions.  For  example,  if  there  are  tshree  labor  types,  the
most  likely  scenario  is  for  two  Labor  t]4)es  to  work  in  one
industry  and  one  in  the  other  industry.  In  this  case,  the  model
retains  its  specific  factors  flavor.  If  the  price  of  any  good
increases,  the  real  returns  to  all-  those  specific  factors  working
in  an  industry  will  increase,  regardless  of  factor  intensity
conditions.  Such  a  result  appears  to  help  explain  the  resul-ts  of
Blanchflower,  et.  al .  (1990),  !,rhere they  found  that  increasing
the  profits  of  an  industry  appear  to  be  shared  by  the  "ski1Ied"
workers  in  that  industry.  Whether  their  conclusion  is  best
explained  by  the  current  competitive  modef  or  their  non-
competi.tive  model  j-s  an  issue  that  needs  to  be  explored  by
examining  the  additional  implications  of  the  two  models,
VIII.  Sunnary.
This  paper  shows  that  by  inEegrating  the  Heckscher-Ohl- in,
speci fic  - factors,  and  Ricardian  models  of  production  it  is
possible  to  achieve  a  tractable  model  capable  of  addressing
important  issues  in  fabor  economics  and  international  trade.  fn
international  trade,  factors  of  production  need  not  be  divided
over  igsues  of  free  Erade  or  protection  and  factor  price
In  labor  economics,  rrre show  that
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egualization  need  nots prevailthe  earnj-ng  of  economic  rents  is  not  inconsistent  lvith
competsiEive  markets  in  general  equilibrium  and  that  process  and
skil-l--based  innovations  have  contrasting  effects  on  wage
inequality.  Process  innovations  may lead  to  wage  inequality,  but
cannot  cause  a  permanent  trend,.  skill-based  (for  labor)
innovations  will  cause  trends  in  wagie inequality,  and  may
strengthen  or  weaken Heckscher-Oh1in  properties.
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